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Introduction: The Internet of Bad Analogies 
 
Last week, the blogosphere was abuzz with the news that Netflix and Comcast had signed a 
“mutually beneficial interconnection agreement.”1 Although the companies did not disclose the 
terms of the deal, most assume that Netflix will pay to connect its servers directly to the Comcast 
network and stream content to Comcast customers more efficiently. Net neutrality proponents, 
already smarting from last month’s D.C. Circuit decision, quickly condemned the agreement as a 
revolutionary and ominous milestone: one called it “water in the basement for the Internet 
industry.”2 But when one strips away the rhetoric and engages in a more nuanced analysis than 
instant-punditry can provide, one sees much less cause for alarm. 
 
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School, who coined the term “net neutrality” a decade ago, 
expressed his concerns through analogy. In a short New Yorker blog post,3 he compared Comcast 
to a restaurant whose most popular dishes were made with fresh tomatoes, but whose service was 
inconsistent because of frequent tomato shortages. When the restaurant’s tomato supplier offers 
to build a storage facility nearby to improve tomato supply, one might expect the restaurant to be 
thrilled. But because Comcast is the only restaurant in town serving tomato dishes, it instead 
demands money from the tomato supplier, knowing that otherwise the tomato supplier would go 
out of business.4 
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If this analogy seems strained, it’s because it is a poor representation of the Internet ecosystem. 
A diner pays the restaurant for his meal. Tomatoes are an input that the restaurant must secure to 
provide the finished product for the consumer. But the broadband consumer does not buy Netflix 
service from Comcast; he buys it directly from Netflix. Netflix must then make arrangements to 
get its streaming video from its servers to the consumer’s broadband provider—which is a cost 
of doing its business. Professor Wu and other critics are not disgruntled Italian food patrons; they 
are more like sports fans who, after buying a stadium ticket, grumble that the venue charges rent 
to the beer vendor. 
 
But even this analogy is imperfect. Internet policy is hard to examine by analogy, as anyone 
knows who has tried to explain the battle in the Supreme Court’s Brand X decision between 
Justice Scalia’s Internet-as-pizza-delivery metaphor and Justice Thomas’s preferred Internet-as-
car-dealership comparison.5 Rather than refracting reality through distorting lenses of other life 
experiences, it is better to discard such analogies and discuss in plain terms how Netflix does 
business and how the Comcast agreement affects its operations. 
 
Eliminating the Middleman 
 
It is a mistake to assume, as many pundits imply, that Netflix pays nothing to get its content to 
the Internet. In fact, Netflix purchases Internet transit service from several different networks 
that are responsible for routing Netflix’s content to the consumer’s broadband provider.6 These 
transit providers then enter peering agreements to exchange Internet traffic with other networks, 
such as Comcast. At the risk of simplification, each network typically pays for the information it 
sends to another network. But if the two exchange roughly the same amount of traffic, they often 
peer for free (an arrangement sometimes called “settlement-free peering”), because the net 
payment is likely to be small and would not offset the transaction cost of determining who 
should pay whom each month. 
 
Late last year, some Netflix customers began experiencing delays, which are likely attributable 
to peering disputes involving one of the company’s primary transit providers, Cogent. As Netflix 
has grown (to generate almost one-third of all U.S. Internet traffic during peak hours), its transit 
providers have been required to send ever-larger volumes of Internet traffic to other networks, 
which can upset preexisting peering agreements. Cogent has been locked in a year-long public 
peering dispute with Verizon.7 Cogent’s increased volume of Netflix-related traffic has 
overwhelmed the existing connections between the Cogent and Verizon networks, meaning the 
connections must be upgraded. Cogent wants to split the cost with Verizon, and to continue 
exchanging traffic for free. Verizon argues that because Cogent traffic has necessitated the 
upgrade, Cogent should pay for the upgrades required to handle the increased data. Verizon also 
wants Cogent to pay for the increased traffic that it is relying on Verizon to deliver. Given that 
Cogent is collecting from Netflix to deliver the traffic, Verizon’s position is not unreasonable. 
But until the connections are upgraded, traffic flows are congested and Netflix customers suffer.8 
Cogent is involved in peering disputes with many other networks, and analysts suggest that a 
similar dispute is likely occurring between Cogent and Comcast.9 
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As Netflix’s service quality declined, the company apparently decided to eliminate the 
middleman. Instead of paying transit fees to Cogent for Comcast-bound traffic, Netflix is instead 
purchasing that transit directly from Comcast. Netflix’s servers, which reside in third-party data 
centers, will be physically connected to Comcast network ports located in those data centers. 
Netflix will then be able to use the Comcast network to send streaming video directly to its 
customers who receive their broadband connection from Comcast. Streaming Media EVP Dan 
Rayburn has written a series of excellent posts describing the details.10 And although this appears 
to be Netflix’s first direct-interconnection deal, these agreements are not uncommon; as Lance 
Ulanoff notes, Comcast has an entire business unit dedicated to selling these services.11 It’s 
important to recognize that this is not a new cost imposed on Netflix, as many have suggested—
it’s simply a business decision by Netflix to pay Comcast rather than Cogent for meeting some of 
its transit needs. 
 
And while it’s premature to assess the impact of this deal, there appears to be little to worry 
about from a public policy perspective. Typically, agreements that eliminate a middleman are 
efficient and welfare-enhancing. Netflix has many options to get its content to the Internet, 
including continuing its relationship with Cogent or contracting with one of many other transit 
providers. The fact that it chose a direct interconnection with Comcast suggests that it found this 
to be the best alternative, either because the price was better or the quality of the service is worth 
any premium over the next-best alternative. Netflix customers who subscribe to broadband 
through Comcast should see improved performance, because the data will travel a more direct 
route from Netflix servers to the customer’s house and will no longer be dependent upon 
potentially overloaded interconnection bottlenecks. 
 
Notably, this deal does not implicate the Federal Communications Commission’s net neutrality 
rules. Net neutrality prohibited wireline broadband providers from blocking access to lawful 
Internet content and applications, and from unreasonably discriminating in the delivery of such 
content to consumers. Although the D.C. Circuit struck down those rules in January,12 the rules 
remain binding on Comcast until 2018 as a condition of the company’s merger with NBC 
Universal. While the Commission has suggested that pay-for-priority agreements would violate 
net neutrality, there is no hint of any such agreement here. The companies have been sparse on 
the details, but their short press release noted explicitly that “Netflix receives no preferential 
network treatment under the multi-year agreement.”13 
 
Professor Wu seems to fault Comcast for charging transit fees rather than agreeing to Netflix’s 
standing offer to use its Open Connect system for free. Open Connect is a content delivery 
network that Netflix is building as an alternative to Cogent and other transit providers, dedicated 
to carrying Netflix traffic.14 Netflix hopes that broadband providers will peer with Open Connect 
and carry Netflix traffic for free. While some smaller providers have signed up, America’s 
largest broadband providers have thus far declined Netflix’s invitation, which is unsurprising. 
Settlement-free peering typically occurs between networks that exchange roughly the same 
amount of traffic. But Open Connect sends much more traffic than it receives from other 
networks.  
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Contrary to popular opinion, operating a network is not costless. The marginal cost of 
transporting data may be trivial (at least during periods of non-congestion), but network 
operators must recover literally hundreds of billions of dollars spent to build America’s 
networks. Moreover, as the Cogent-Verizon dispute shows, traffic is growing, which necessitates 
ongoing network upgrades that some estimate will cost $40 billion annually. Some of those 
tremendous costs can be recovered through end-user subscription fees. But if Netflix is using a 
network to deliver its product to consumers, it’s not unfair to ask the company to contribute to 
the cost of building and maintaining that network. Every dollar recovered from a business deal is 
a dollar less that network providers must recover from consumers. The fact that Netflix pays 
Cogent and other content delivery networks to provide transit service is uncontroversial. The 
Netflix-Comcast agreement should be no more controversial just because the identity of the 
transit provider has changed, or because the transit provider also happens to manage a last-mile 
broadband network. 
 
Conclusion: The Future of Internet Regulation 
 
Because of the intense spotlight that commentators have placed on this agreement, it is possible 
that regulators will begin looking more closely at interconnection agreements and other 
negotiations between network operators. Traditionally, the Federal Communications 
Commission has focused primarily on the residential end-user broadband market, and to a lesser 
extent on commercial broadband access. But many net neutrality proponents have encouraged 
the Commission to turn its attention upstream in the Internet ecosystem as well. The D.C. 
Circuit’s Verizon decision recognized that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act gives the 
Commission at least some authority to “promulgate rules governing broadband providers’ 
treatment of Internet traffic” and “how broadband providers treat edge providers.”15 As Professor 
Christopher Yoo noted in an earlier Free State Foundation Perspectives piece, the scope of that 
authority is unclear, and there are good arguments to interpret it relatively narrowly. But concern 
in some circles about the effect of interconnection agreements on markets for Internet content 
and applications may lead the Commission to test the boundaries of the Verizon decision. 
 
But there appears no justification at present for such a radical expansion of the Commission’s 
mandate. Independently of the legal concerns that Professor Yoo and others have identified, 
regulatory interference with backbone providers, transit markets, and peering arrangements 
would simply be bad policy, especially absent strong evidence of a significant market failure. 
The markets for peering and transit are as robust and competitive as they come. Content 
providers can choose from a wide range of transit providers, some of which specialize in transit 
alone, while others provide a variety of complementary services as well.16 Some provide service 
only within a limited geographic area, while others operate across continents. These networks 
famously subsist on razor-thin margins. Transit prices have fallen, dramatically, every quarter 
and will continue to do so for the near future.17  
 
The Netflix deal shows that Comcast may be increasing its footprint in this space. While this step 
may not be as revolutionary as the blogosphere suggests, it may be somewhat evolutionary. 
Professor Wu and others are concerned that Comcast may leverage its position as a residential 
broadband provider to gain an unfair advantage in this upstream market. The robustness of the 
transit market, and the importance of uninterrupted transit to the functioning of the Internet 
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overall, makes that unlikely. Antitrust law continues to oversee this space, as it does most of the 
American economy, and it is poised to combat abuses of market power that actually harm 
consumers. Though Cogent may disagree, Netflix and Comcast’s decision to eliminate the 
middleman is not inherently anticompetitive and is likely welfare-enhancing because it gets 
services to consumers faster and with fewer potential interruptions. 
 
We should expect this type of creative destruction in markets as dynamic as Internet service, 
where new innovations demand new and better ways to reach consumers. The agreement may be 
bad for Cogent and other less efficient providers wedded to the status quo, but it is consistent 
with an ecosystem that is rapidly changing in capability and complexity. To paraphrase Mark 
Twain, I suspect that rumors of the Internet’s demise have been greatly exaggerated.  
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member of 
the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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